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Everyone, you will find, is an expert 
on public opinion; after all he is a member  
of the public and he knows how he feels 
and what he thinks on an issue. Or does he? 
(Lane and Sears, 1964: preface) 
1 Introduction 
 
In the first edition of the scientific journal Public Opinion Quarterly, Floyd Allport (1937) 
argued to his readers that the concept of public opinion had fell victim to the “vivid imagery” 
(Allport, 1937:7) of writers. According to Allport, this vivid imagery of writers often led to 
the portrayal of both the public as well as public opinion as a single entity that displayed 
personal traits. These traits included the public as having a consciousness and a voice. Allport 
distanced himself from such a personalized notion of both public opinion as well as the 
public (Allport, 1937:8-9). According to Allport, the fiction that public opinion is some sort 
of being or “daemon” that shows different expressions over time, limits the ability of scholars 
to properly research changes in public opinion. Instead of looking at public opinion as a 
single collective entity, public opinion rather is the product of a wide array of different 
individual opinions. The observation that public opinion is an aggregate of different 
individual opinions also means that the term “public” cannot be a universal term. One cannot 
identify “the public” simply because such a terminology is too inclusive and prohibits 
scholars to make meaningful distinctions between different groups and individuals (Allport, 
1937:9). Instead, Allport provided a definition of public opinion is a “multi-individual 
situation in which individuals express themselves […] as favoring or supporting some 
definite condition, person, or proposal of widespread importance” (Allport, 1937:23). 
By defining public opinion as an aggregate construct, based on a multitude of different 
individual opinions, the definition has implications on how to research this concept. The most 
important implication of this definition is that changes in public opinion originate at the 
individual level. It is not until a significant number of individuals each change their opinion 
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on a certain subject that there can be a change in public opinion. Research on public opinion 
then becomes preoccupied with questions on how individuals change their opinion on a wide 
range of issues. What are the influences, both internal as well as external to the individual, 
that moderate a change in opinion?  
One of the most influential theories on changes in public opinion comes from John Zaller. 
In his book The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, Zaller (1992) presents a model in 
which individual political knowledge (Zaller uses the term political awareness as an analogue 
to political knowledge) is operationalized to predict the likelihood that an individual will 
receive an additional piece of information and eventually accept his or her opinion on a 
certain subject. In general, this model describes a three step process in which the reception, 
acceptance and sampling of different messages influences the probability that an individual 
will change his or her opinion. Because of these three steps, the model is abbreviated as 
“RAS”.   
At the turn of the previous decade, voters in the Netherlands expressed a change in public 
opinion concerning the issue of integration of non-western immigrants. Based on the 1998 
Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (DPES), 34% of the population answered that non-
western immigrants should (almost) completely adjust to Dutch culture. In 2002, this number 
had risen to 48.7% (Todosijevic et al., 2010).  
1.1 Research questions 
The intent of this thesis is to apply the RAS model to the above described change in 
public opinion in the Netherlands. By taking observed change in public opinion on the 
subject of immigration and integration of non-western immigrants, the aim of this research is 
to see whether messages coming through the media did indeed influence changes in opinion 
depending on the level of political knowledge an individual has.  
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The notion that political awareness influences the likelihood of an individual to receive 
and subsequently accept a mediated message has been described by some as the main 
contribution of the RAS model (Dobrzynska and Blais, 2008:260). The claim made by Zaller 
is that individuals who possess higher levels of political awareness are first of all more likely 
to receive a message, while at the same time those same individuals are more able to connect 
their general values alongside with the messages they encounter. Because of this mechanism, 
Zaller asserts that individuals who are more politically aware are better able to reject, or to 
resist, new information. Zaller formulates the ability of individuals to resist messages as 
“information concerning the relationship between arguments and predispositions, where the 
requisite information is carried in cueing messages” (Zaller, 1992:44). Those individuals that 
can be regarded as politically aware are better able to argue against new information that is 
coming to them from the media and are thus less likely to exhibit a change in opinion. The 
first research question takes this relationship between political awareness and changes in 
public opinion as its starting point and is thus formulated as follows: 
 
RQ1: Can an observed change in public opinion on the subject of non-western 
immigrants be accounted to differences in political awareness according to the RAS 
model? 
 
In the same manner that not every individual is as knowledgeable on political issues, the 
same can be said on the susceptibility of an individual to eventually change his or her opinion 
based on information that is received through the media. A second question that is raised by 
the RAS model is concerned with how varying levels of political beliefs influence the 
likelihood that a certain type of voter will change his or her opinion.  
In the RAS model these political beliefs, Zaller uses the term political predispositions, are 
seen as internal individual-level traits “that regulate the acceptance or non-acceptance of the 
political communication the person receives” (Zaller, 1992:22). These predispositions, which 
6 
 
are more available to the politically aware (Zaller, 1992:44), tend to be a resistance factor for 
an individual to change his or her opinion. According to the RAS model, these different 
individual predispositions should lead to different levels of resistance towards a dominant 
message that is being transmitted up through the media. Based on these different political 
predispositions and the RAS model, it can therefore be expected that changes in opinion at 
the individual level occurs at a different pace dependent on these predispositions. The second 
research question can then be formulated as follows: 
RQ2: Do different levels of political predispositions moderate resistance and acceptance 
of a dominant media message, and thereby a change in opinion, according to the RAS 
model? 
 
1.2 Relevance  
There has been much research performed on the field of public opinion. Within this 
vast body of research, the RAS model has been one of the most influential theories on 
changes in public opinion (Dobrzynska and Blais, 2008:259).  
Although there is quite a substantial body of research that seems to confirm the 
assumptions on which the theoretical model of the RAS model has been build, tests of the 
RAS model instead reveal very mixed results. Furthermore, the tests that are available  
provide the field of public opinion research a situation in which sometimes only parts of the 
model are utilized. This means that the RAS model sometimes is employed as an assumption 
to further test different hypotheses. In these situations, the RAS model provides an  
explanation for a certain effect while the model itself is only referred to “en passant”  
(Dobrzynska and Blais, 2008:261). However, these studies do not provide a direct test of the 
RAS model (Bartels, 1993; Clarke et al., 1999; Hansen 1998; Nelson et al., 1997).  
Other research does actually test the RAS model, but only uses parts of it. For 
example, there are various studies that only utilize the acceptance axiom, without taking the 
probability of reception into account (Gilens, 2001; Beck et. al, 2002; Shah et al. 2002). As 
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was previously noted, the biggest contribution of the RAS model is providing an insight into 
the relationship between political awareness upon a change in opinion in the stages of 
reception and acceptance of a media message.  
Another example of tests of the RAS model shows the usage of measurements for political 
awareness that can be seen as doubtful. In this study by Huber and Arceneaux (2007) into the 
effects of education and interest on the effectiveness of campaign advertising, instead of 
measuring political awareness as correct answers to factual political questions, the number of 
years of education an individual received is used as a measurement of political awareness. 
Zaller notes that his usage of political awareness is generally less effective in comparison to 
factual questions on the specific issue, so called domain-specific questions. However, such 
questions are rarely asked in surveys. As such, political awareness is a measurement 
pertaining to the general interest and attentiveness towards politics (Zaller, 1992:43). Years 
of education in this respect is harder to see as an indicator for such attentiveness since it is 
likely that there are many individuals who are highly educated but do not have much political 
knowledge as well as vice versa.  
The (partial) tests that have been conducted to test the model show mixed results. 
Some found a confirmation on the RAS model (for example: Kriesi, 2002). Others research 
reaches the conclusion that the relationship between acceptance and political awareness is 
less dominant and that people base their opinions on prior beliefs (Goren, 2004), while 
Krosnick and Brannon (2003) find results that not political awareness but attention to 
political news influences changes in mass opinion. Even Zaller demonstrated that in the case 
of the Presidential approval ratings of former President Clinton during the Monica Lewinsky 
scandal, changes in public opinion not always follow along the lines of mediated elite cues 
(1998).  
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The results that are available are “ambiguous” (Dobrzynska and Blais, 2008:261) to 
say the least. Furthermore, the model has not yet been tested with varying political 
predispositions. For example, in their test of the RAS model in the 1988 Canada 
parliamentary elections Dobrzynska and Blais utilize predispositions as a dichotomous 
variable (Dobrzynska and Blais, 2008:260), and even Zaller most of the time uses a 
dichotomous variable for political predispositions, most times only denoting Democrats and 
Republicans (Zaller, 1992; Zaller, 1994; Zaller 1996). Being able to identify more detailed 
political predispositions and applying them into the RAS model could thus enhance the 
general understanding of the model. The previously mentioned mixed results that have been 
reported on the RAS model in the past raise questions concerning the conditions under which 
the model can predict changes in public opinion and under which conditions it cannot.  
 
1.3 Case Selection 
 Based on the RAS model, changes in public opinion are dependent on a measurement 
of an individuals’ degree of political knowledge, the measurement of an individuals’ political 
predispositions towards a subject and the existence of gaps in the transmission of opposing 
viewpoints on a subject coming from the media. How these three elements are related to each 
other and how they function in the RAS model will be covered more extensively in the next 
chapter. At this moment the elements are presented to explain what the necessary information 
is, in order to test the RAS model, and how they can be found in the case of change in 
opinion towards allowing non-western immigrants to preserve their own cultural customs.  
As far as the case of integration of non-western immigrants goes, it showed a, albeit 
small, spike in mass opinion change in 2002 (Van Holsteyn and Den Ridder, 2005:118). 
Since 1994, the DPES included questions on the subject of integration of non-western 
immigrants and the amount of asylum seekers that should be allowed into the country 
(Todosijevic et al., 2010: pp. 144-157). As was noted before, in 2002 respondents showed an 
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increase towards less self-preservation of non-western immigrants and a harder line towards 
asylum seekers. In the short period between the elections of 2002 and 2003, this change was 
reversed. The subject of immigration thus presents itself as a suitable case to test the RAS 
model with the possibility of two changes in opinion on one subject. 
Furthermore, the DPES includes questions that have been asked to respondents which 
can be regarded as political predispositions on the above described issue. These questions 
include self-placement of respondents on a left-right scale. Further justification of the usage 
of this variable for political predispositions can be found in the section on operationalization.  
A final requirement to test the RAS model is a clear increase and divergence in mass 
media coverage on the issue of immigration and integration from that period. Zaller labels 
such differences in attention of the media towards a subject as reception gaps (Zaller, 
1996:22.) Although coverage of any subject varies over time, a 2007 study on the relationship 
between media and parliamentary coverage on immigration and integration shows a quite 
stable line on the subject starting in 1995, when measurement started, until July 2001. After 
that time period the amount of mass media coverage on the subject increased, while at the 
same time the tone of the message changed. The tone of the message changed in such a way 
that the debate on non-western immigrants became more focused on adapting Western 
European values and less on the right of cultural self-preservation (Vliegenthart and 
Roggeband, 2007). Vliegenthart and Roggeband support this conclusion by providing a count 
of pro- and anti-Islamic frames between 1995 and 2004.  
Testing which influences affect a change in public opinion can in general best be done 
by the usage of panel data. Such a research setup would allow researchers to study a fixed 
sample and determine the influence of individual factors such as political awareness and 
political predispositions. Unfortunately, the four sources of information, a change in opinion, 
individual level political awareness and political predispositions as well as data that shows 
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the existence of reception gaps that are needed to test the RAS model are not always as 
readily available as one would hope for. This problem gets even bigger when such data is 
needed at multiple points in time for the same respondents. As such, the RAS model is also 
an attempt to overcome the unavailability of such data. Fortunately, panel data for the change 
in public opinion on this issue is available. The 2003 Parliamentary elections were held 8 
months after the 2002 Parliamentary elections. Due to the short period of time between these 
two elections, a complete DPES covering a pre- and a post-wave over a sample representative 
of the electorate was unfeasible due to constraints on resources.  The resulting election study 
that was held under respondents who participated in the 2002 DPES post-wave provides 
panel data on the change in public opinion from  the 2002 DPES towards the 2003 DPES. 
The availability of this panel allows for an almost unique possibility to test the RAS model on 
panel data. 
1.4 Structure 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. First, the thesis starts with a review of the RAS 
model and its assumptions. After reporting on these assumptions, the general statistical model 
that is used by the Zaller to explain changes in public opinion is presented. Based on the 
presentation of the general statistical model a literature overview is presented in which the 
assumptions that the RAS model makes will be reviewed and be put into historical 
perspective. After presenting the RAS model and the literature review, the hypotheses that 
will be tested in combination with an account of the selected case are presented. After 
providing an account of the variables and statistical procedures that will be, the actual results 
will be presented and discussed.  
The main question of this thesis revolves around the question if an individual is able 
to resist a dominant media message? And if an individual is able to resist it, can resistance be 
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identified based on certain political predispositions and political awareness? The framework 
provided by the RAS model allows us to research these questions. 
2 The RAS model 
 
As was mentioned in the introduction, one of the most important and influential contributions 
in the last two decades on the question of changes in public opinion has come from John 
Zaller (1992). In his book, “The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion”, Zaller builds a 
theoretical model that tries to shed light on the ongoing question how public opinion changes. 
The RAS model presented by Zaller is a theory that is based on four different axioms. When 
these axioms are put together, they combine into a piped model of opinion change. The 
model then becomes a tool to determine the likelihood that an individual will change his or 
her opinion based on  political awareness, political predispositions and media content. 
2.1 Axioms of the RAS model 
In his own words, Zaller states that all theories, including his, “tend leak from the 
joints” (Zaller, 1992:2). This simple observation is based on the fact that every theory is in 
essence an abstraction of the reality it tries to describe. The RAS model in that respect is no 
different from any other scientific theory one may encounter. Zaller acknowledges this fact 
even further by stating that none of the individual axioms constitute a perfect representation 
of reality. It is when the axioms are put together, that the full strength of the model becomes 
visible (Zaller, 1992:41). First, these axioms will be described. Afterwards theoretical support 
will be given for each of the processes involved in the RAS model. 
Based on the RAS model, receiving and accepting a message is a necessary condition 
for an individual to undergo a change in opinion. The first two axioms of the RAS model are 
concerned with these two stages of reception and acceptance of messages. Zaller treats these 
two stages as separate because he claims there is insufficient evidence that supports the 
theory of selective exposure. “[…] exposure to one side of an argument is uncorrelated with 
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exposure to the other side in other words, that selective exposure does not occur” (Zaller, 
1991:1217).  Reception, by which Zaller means that an individual comprehends a message, 
and acceptance do not depend on the predispositions of an individual.  
The first axiom states that the more an individual is cognitively engaged with a 
political issue, the more likely that individual is to be exposed and comprehend a message on 
that political issue (Zaller, 1992:42).  
The second axiom covers the level of resistance to a political message. It denotes that 
individuals that can be regarded as politically aware are more able to resist arguments that are 
inconsistent with their political predispositions in comparison to individuals that can be seen 
as less politically aware. Politically aware individual are able to perceive a relationship 
between the message and their predispositions (Zaller, 1992:44).  
The third axiom states that the more recent a consideration has been called to mind, 
the less time it takes to bring that consideration to use (Zaller, 1992:48).  
The fourth axiom touches the issue of response instability and states that when 
individuals answer survey questions, they average “across the considerations that are 
immediately salient or accessible to them” (Zaller, 1992:49). 
Based on the first two axioms, one is able to see the role of political knowledge as an 
independent variable to determine the probability of receiving and accepting a message. 
Zaller refers however to political knowledge in general as political awareness, although they 
describe the same concept (see Zaller, 1992:6-39 for more information). Zaller goes on to 
argue that political awareness is the best explanatory variable in comparison to for example 
interest in politics (Zaller, 1992:43), or self-reported media consumption (Price and Zaller, 
1993; Zaller, 1996).  
The first two axioms also prescribe the actual change in attitude based upon the likelihood of 
receiving and accepting a message (Zaller, 1992:118-124). The third and fourth axiom both 
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show that the intensity and strength of a message influences the likelihood of receiving, 
accepting and recalling that message. Based on these four axioms, the probability of a change 
in attitude thus has a general form of: 
 (      )    (       )   (      |       ) 
 (eq. 1) 
 
 
Figure 1: Reception and Acceptance curves 
 
 
Derived from eq. 1, the separate processes that determine the likelihood of receiving and 
accepting a single message are shown in figure 1. The solid line describes the likelihood that 
an individual will change his or her attitudes towards a subject. From this figure it becomes 
clear that the actual process of change in opinion follows, at least according to the RAS 
model, a non-linear pattern. 
  It is important to denote that this is a base model, and that it applies to a single sided 
message only. This means that this graph is the general representation of likelihood that 
individuals will change their opinion upon receiving one type of message only. However, it 
does show the relationship between political awareness and the likelihood of reception and 
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acceptance. Zaller acknowledges the fact that this probability model of attitudinal change has 
been thought of by McGuire (1969), but goes on to advance these probabilities in two areas. 
First of all, Zaller provides a model by actually defining functions that prescribe the 
probability of receiving and accepting a message. Second of all, Zaller advances this model 
by incorporating two-sided messages (Zaller, 1992:124-126). 
In 1996, Zaller published a revision of his model in which he refined the 
mathematical form of his model. Although “the new forms are similar to those of older ones, 
the new models are more realistic, powerful, and simple” (Zaller, 1996:21), the main 
argument that comes from this revision is the fact that not elite communication, but mass 
communication lies at the heart of changes in public opinion.  
Zaller introduces the concept “reception gaps” (Zaller, 1996:23). A gap in reception 
occurs when the likelihood exists that someone will receive one side of a message over the 
other. The bigger the gap in reception between opposing messages, the more likely it is that 
an individual will change his position and adopt a new opinion in the direction of  the 
dominant message (Zaller, 1996:23). The probability of individual opinion change then 
becomes a combination of political awareness, strength and intensity of the competing 
messages and an individual’s predispositions towards the messages. In his revision, Zaller 
describes that the probability that an individual will change his opinion, from his or her 
previous opinion towards the new dominant message that comes through the media, is based 
on the probability that an individual will be influenced by this dominant message and not be 
influenced by the previous message (Zaller, 1996:33-35).  
If we apply this logic to the Dutch case of immigration and consider the message that 
non-western immigrants should adjust to Dutch culture (monocultural) as the new dominant 
message, the general form of this revised RAS model then takes the shape of: 
     (      )   (                                        ) 
                    (    (                                         )) 
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(eq. 2) 
 
2.2 RAS Model in practice 
Because of the instable attitudes individuals tend to show on survey responses (Zaller, 
1992), the RAS model has been described by some as the “really downbeat version” 
(Kuklinsky and Peyton, 2007) on public opinion. Although these authors are both highly 
regarded scholars, there is some merit to be found to argue the opposite. At first sight, it 
seems obvious that the RAS model, and especially the third and fourth axiom, leads to a 
downbeat versions of research on public opinion. After all, the model proposes that the 
attitudes that individuals express may vary over time, predominantly due to political 
considerations that comes from “the top of the head” (Kuklinsky and Peyton, 2007:51; Zaller, 
1992:76-96).  
Unfortunately, this description of the RAS model only takes into account the 
assumption of accepting a message. However, the RAS model is not only a description of 
accepting messages that get communicated the loudest. And as was mentioned earlier in the 
case of the Lewinsky scandal, not all instances of change in public opinion can be seem from 
a viewpoint that the changes are in line with the content of messages that are transmitted. 
Instead, the RAS model is an attempt to show how political awareness and political 
predispositions influence not only the likelihood of accepting a message, but also the 
likelihood of an individual receiving a message. Judging the RAS model as a model of 
change in public opinion in which the message that gets communicated the most vigorously 
will correspond with a change in public opinion is only a part of the theory. Instead, the 
model shows that citizens are able to receive information from multiple sources and are 
guided by previous knowledge and predispositions before any message is eventually accepted 
and possibly sampled.  
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The negative side to this observation is that, as was noted in the introduction, it is 
based on the notion that it is unrealistic to assume a fully knowledgeable public. Not every 
individual has the same amount of prior knowledge to process new information (Zaller, 
1992:7). Furthermore, it is well acknowledged that individuals use different types of 
heuristics to receive and accept political information. These heuristics include political parties 
and other institutions (Sniderman and Bullock, 2004). These difference between individuals 
create a challenge to create a general model of changes in public opinion. 
By reviewing the model as the separate components of reception, acceptance and 
sampling, it becomes easier see the merits of the theory. The first component is that of 
reception. As mentioned previously, Zaller does not adhere to the concepts of selective 
exposure and sees reception of messages by individuals in the view of their relative strength 
and the levels of political awareness. The assumption that reception of messages is not based 
on selection but on political awareness, can be linked to other research covering the reception 
of political news.  From the side of professional politics, politicians and their political 
operatives carry the strong conviction that what media say about them will affect them on 
election day (Bartels, 1993:267). This conviction is not without grounds, as Brians and 
Wattenberg (1996) show. According to their research, political news can be received and 
processed through the media, albeit that commercials tend have the biggest effect in 
comparison to TV news and newspapers (Brians and Wattenberg, 1996:185). And although 
watching the news is different from actually receiving the news (Sears and Kosterman, 
1994:8), Price and Zaller (1993) show that, depending on the level of issue salience and the 
level of political knowledge, respondents do are able to receive information through news 
media. The idea that reception of political news is dependent on one’s interest and prior 
knowledge of both politics in general and on the subject, thus seems highly plausible.  
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Based on the RAS model, acceptance of a message is contingent on receiving the 
message. But who is persuaded by a message? It is generally agreed that individuals use 
relations with prior knowledge on issues upon encountering new information (Lang, 
2000:47). During the processing of new information, individuals store a message in reference 
to other information in that, according to the processor, fits together. These associative 
networks have been, among others, helpful in identifying how individuals process and 
retrieve bits of information (Lodge and Hamill, 1986:506). Because of the associative nature 
of these networks, they have become known as schemas. Associations between different 
subjects grow stronger as individuals become more frequently exposed to new information in 
reference to prior knowledge. This provides theoretical explanation for the second axiom. 
Although there is general agreement on the concept that individuals are far from 
perfect processors of information, there are different theories on how people incorporate new 
information. Two of the most notable being the on-line model on the one hand (Lodge et al., 
1986; Lodge et al. 1995) and the RAS model on the other hand. The on-line model of 
information processing is a model that describes the change in attitudes as an accumulation of 
new information. Instead of saving the information as a whole, the information is processed 
and evaluated before it is purged. Only the evaluation towards the subject remains. 
  Although the concept of Bayesian updating is admitted to have its merits, different 
scholar show the effect of new information depends highly on previous information (Bartels, 
1993:275); How the new information is framed (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989:35-36) and 
the salience of an individual towards the subject (Sears and Kosterman, 1994:12). Some go 
even further, stating that people who score high on political sophistication have better 
schemas to process the information and place it into context (Rhee and Capella, 1997: 229).            
These studies all share the general idea of Zaller, that political awareness increases 
once ability to process new information and place it in an existing framework of prior 
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knowledge, instead of an on-line tally on which people add and subtract new bits of 
summarized information (Zaller, 1992: 42-51).  
As far as sampling goes, it is fair to say that most individuals do not give stable 
responses on survey questions. Based on the discussion around the conclusions made by 
Converse (1964) only a small portion of the population is able to provide constant and stable 
answers to political questions. As Zaller points out, this observation is an argument against 
the on-line model (Zaller, 1992:50). These discrepancies have been accounted to 
measurement error, but is has never been explained why these errors would occur. (see 
Kinder and Sears, 1985).   
As far as sampling goes, other research has shown that the amount of total 
information that is available to an individual, is of influence on the probability that people 
actually have a response (Basinger and Lavine, 2005; McGraw et al. 2003; Meffert et al. 
2004; Price and Zaller, 1993). These studies are in line with the third and fourth axiom. 
 
2.3 Public opinion research 
Obviously, the presentation of the RAS model has to be seen as an evolution in the 
field of scientific research.  In the formulation of the RAS model, Zaller frequently refers to 
American scholar Walter Lippmann. In his book Public Opinion, Lippmann (1922) distances 
himself from the general notion that all citizens adhere to the image of a “homo politicus”. 
Instead Lippmann argues that citizens are far from ideal citizens who are highly engaged in 
politics and fully informed before they cast their vote (Lippmann, 1925). Lippmann argues 
that in order to form an opinion on a wide variety of subjects, citizens are dependent on their 
environment for the information they obtain. These environments are called “pseudo-
environments” and are, according to Lippmann, based on a subjective interpretation of 
information that is presented to him instead of  “direct and certain knowledge” (Lippmann, 
1922:16). Lippmann supports his claim by the simple but logical consistent observation that 
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people have different and competing ideas on a wide variety of subjects. Because of the 
existence of differences in opinions, it is likely that these differences in opinion are based on 
the limited and subjective availability of information to an individual in the pseudo-
environments.   
The argument made by Lippmann has to be seen in the view of a period in time in 
which the political information that eventually did reach an individual, was most likely to be  
presented in the form of newspapers. However, the notion  individuals are influenced in their 
formation of opinions by the media is likely to even have a bigger impact in today’s media 
landscape. 
The observation that political information is proliferated predominantly through the 
media gives, according to Lippmann, rise to a structural paradox: That of the spread of free 
information in contrast to the commercial paradigm that is involved in the free market 
(Lippmann, 1922:202). Lippmann was one of the first to see the problematic relationship 
between the normative as well as the commercial role newspapers play in society, i.e. 
providing individuals and groups with information on the one side while at the same time 
competing with other news outlets on the other side. This means that a society treats 
newspapers in a schizophrenic fashion because it applies two different standards on the way 
they function. In the words of Lippmann: “One ethical measure to the press and another to 
trade or manufacture” (Lippmann, 1922:204). These two spheres in which the media 
functions has most striking been described by the Hutchins Commission, in their report on a 
free and both a responsible press: “The press […] is caught between its desire to please and 
extend its audience and its desire to give a picture of events and people as they really are” 
(Hutchins et al., 1947:57). And the situation is not exclusive to the American case, as has 
been thoroughly described by Hallin and Mancini (2004) in their conceptualization of 
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different media systems in Western and Southern Europe as well as the Anglo-American 
countries.  
One of the best examples of this paradox can probably be found in the process of 
media commercialization. In the process of media commercialization, there is an increase in 
the amount of actors that provide news and information, both political and non-political. 
These actors are not paid for by means of government spending and instead have to rely on 
commercials means to create revenues (Aalberg et al., 2010). This process, in which media-
outlets have to survive, choices on what news to broadcast can get lead by economic 
incentives (Holtz-Bacha, 2004). As a result, the format in which the news gets presented can 
be structured in such a way so that it attracts an increased audience. Examples of such 
processes are the usage of presenting political news in a conflict driven horse-race 
environment as well as the combination of hard political news and entertainment (Brants, 
1998). Research in the field of agenda setting (McCombs and Shaw, 1975; McCombs and 
Shaw, 1993) and framing (Entman, 1993; Chong and Druckman, 2007) has showed that the 
media is of influence on what the public thinks about and how to think about it. As such, the 
media is able to influence public opinion.  
Another seminal contribution to the field of public opinion has come from V.O. Key. 
In his contribution on public opinion, democracy and the United States, Key (1961) described 
the role of political elites in shaping and altering public opinion, leading eventually up to 
political action. According to Key the notion of a public opinion can only exist insofar that 
there exists the likelihood that public opinion can be converted into public policy (Key, 
1961:538). Interactions between political elites, or those who are politically attentive, and the 
mass, or those who are politically inattentive, lead to changes in public opinion. But, as Key 
states, “mass opinion is not self-generating; in the main, it is a response to the cues, the 
proposals, and the visions propagated by the political activists” (Key, 1961:557).  
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In contrast to the conclusions made by Key, scholars from the University of Michigan 
concluded that the short-term changes voters expressed in their opinion were not due to 
interactions between political elites and the mass, but instead based on short-term changes in 
attitudes towards the object of politics (Campbell et al.1960:65). These changes in attitudes 
did not originate at the level of political elites, as Key argued, but rather come from  
incoherent patterns of believe (Campbell et al. 1960:543).  
  As a member of the University of Michigan team, Converse (1964) displayed that 
most Americans do not have coherent belief systems. In his seminal article on mass belief 
systems, Converse  examined open-ended questionnaires as well as survey responses given 
by respondents in different American National Election Studies (ANES) in the 1950’s. 
Puzzled by the question if there would be a difference in beliefs systems between political 
elites on the one hand and mass publics on the other hand, Converse set out to identify these 
differences in belief system. A belief system was defined as being a “configuration of ideas 
and attitudes in which elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional 
interdependence” (Converse, 1964:3). The results were however surprising. Converse 
concluded that only the top 10% of Americans held stable and coherent attitudes, and as such 
can be placed within a belief system. Because most respondents did not display a high level 
of coherence in the answers they gave, from which Converse concluded that these 
respondents did not hold true beliefs, as Converse was unable to map the mass public into a 
belief system (Converse, 1964:66). Besides ideological variance, these respondents would 
also display variance in their answers over time. This over time instability displayed by most 
respondents led to the conclusion that most of the mass public was unable to have true 
attitudes. Based on this observation, Converse introduced the concept of nonattitudes. 
Respondents who could be labeled as having nonattitudes made up almost 90% of the 
complete population. They would respond to questions in such an inconsistent way that they 
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could not be considered ideologues (Converse, 1964:15). The biggest variable that predicted 
the likelihood of a respondent being an ideologue was the years of education. Years of 
education correlated highly with the amount of political knowledge individuals had 
(Converse, 1964:41). The idea of nonattitudes “triggered a landslide of research” (Saris and 
Sniderman, 2004:3). One of the biggest reactions to this conclusion came from scholars who 
attributed the lack of consistent attitudes in survey responses to methodological issues 
(Aachen, 1975; See Bartels, 2010 for an overview). According to subsequent research,  
measurement errors could account for most of the nonattitudes, and most respondents did 
answer in a coherent way. 
  The RAS model has to be seen in view of the conclusions made by Converse and the 
subsequent critique towards those conclusions. Zaller not only dismisses the idea of 
measurement error, stating that it is unlikely that measurement errors could explain roughly 
30% of the variation and attitude instability displayed by respondents. Instead of nonattitudes 
or measurement error, Zaller expands on the observations made by Converse claiming that 
the phenomenon of attitude instability is not due to a lack in true attitudes. Instead, attitude 
instability is caused by abundances of information, or opposing considerations, from which 
individuals sample relevant portions (Zaller, 1992:34-39). Zaller furthermore acknowledges 
his intellectual debt to McGuire (1969) on the idea that changes in attitudes are not only 
based on acceptance of those message, but are also contingent on the likelihood of receiving 
that message.   
  According to Zaller, the RAS model is a long needed attempt in the field of public 
opinion research to integrate different domain-specific theories on changes in opinion, 
preferences and attitudes. The argument to integrate these different field of public opinion 
research lies in the fact that, according to Zaller, each domain can be treated “as simply 
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another context in which citizens formulate responses on the basis of the ides that have 
reached then and been found acceptable” (Zaller, 1992:2). 
2.4 Hypotheses 
The RAS model itself denotes a dynamic process at the individual level. Derived from the 
above mentioned review of the RAS model, it can be expected that an individuals’ political 
awareness influences the likelihood that he or she will receive and afterwards accept and 
sample a new opinion.  
Based on axioms one and two, the RAS model prescribes that political awareness 
influences the likelihood of receiving a message in a positive way while at the same time it 
decreases the likelihood of accepting a dissonant message. In essence, these two axioms 
denote a proportional and a inversely proportional probability for respectively reception and 
acceptance of a message as was showed previously. When these two probabilities are 
combined, they produce a nonlinear pattern that indicates the probability that an individual 
will change his or her opinion, based on political awareness. This leads to the formulation of 
the first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Political awareness influences the probability that an individual will change his or 
her opinion according to a nonlinear pattern. 
 
The second research question in this research proposal is concerned with identifying 
multiple political predispositions and test how they affect the probability of opinion change. 
In order to test the RAS model for multiple political predispositions, it is necessary to define 
a measurement that allows us to distinguish between different predispositions. The issue of 
integration can be seen from a cultural “left-right” point of view. Although the concept of 
“left-right” is fluid, and can be defined along multiple dimensions (Fuchs and Klingemann, 
1989:206) it does offer a way to apply a simplification and a comparison to “multi-layered 
realities” (Mair, 2007:220). The 2002 elections showed a relationship between left-right 
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placement of individuals and their stance towards a multicultural or monocultural society. 
Individuals who are adhere more to the left, are more often associated with a positive view 
towards a multicultural society, while those individuals who adhere more to the right are 
more often associated with a monocultural society (Pellikaan et al., 2007:296). As such, it is 
plausible to expect that individuals who are more right-wing oriented tend to be more 
conservative and therefor more in favor of the position that non-western immigrants should 
be adjusting to Dutch culture. It can thus be expected that the more an individual identifies 
with the political right, the more likely he/she is to adopt a new opinion based on the 
dominant message of adjusting to Dutch culture. Because of the expected variance in 
message resistance, we would expect to identify different probabilities of changes in opinion 
depending on the political predispositions of such an individual: 
H2: The more individuals identify with the right, the more likely it is that individuals 
express a change opinion towards a more extreme position favoring nonwestern 
immigrants to adjust to Dutch culture. 
 
3 Operationalization and Methods 
 
3.1 Operationalization 
The main independent variable at the individual level is political awareness. This variable 
denotes the extent to which an individual “pays attention to politics and understands what he 
or she has encountered” (Zaller, 1992:21). This variable is, according to Zaller, best 
measured by test of political facts and can be seen as a unidimensional variable (Zaller, 
1986), although there are scholars who disagree on that issue (see Delli Carpini and Keeter, 
1993 for an overview of this discussion)
1
. Knowledge on these political facts can be seen as  
a measurement for “intellectual engagement” (Zaller, 1992:21). In order to provide as much 
variance as possible on this variable, every question that can be seen as an indicator of factual 
                                                 
1
 The conclusion of Delli Carpini and Keeter however, is that political knowledge is a “relatively 
unidimensional concept”  (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1993:1203). 
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knowledge is utilized in such a manner that it provides an additive scale of political 
knowledge ranging from 0, meaning that an individual lacks any political knowledge, 
towards a maximum, which would describe respondents that can be regarded as fully 
politically aware. 
Since its beginning in 1971, the DPES includes photo recognition questions of various 
politicians. Per politician, respondents were asked to name the politician, identify the party to 
which the politician belongs and the function he or she has. A total of four politicians are 
shown during the interview. The responses to these questions are then aggregated, awarding 1 
for a correct answer and 0 for an incorrect answer. The result is a 13-point scale ranging from 
low towards high in political awareness.  
It is however important to denote that this scale of political awareness only utilizes 
one type of question: Photo recognition of politicians. It would be better to incorporate a 
wider range of question not only covering photo recognition but also include factual 
questions on the role of government and parliament (Zaller, 1996:60-62). Unfortunately, the 
DPES does not provide other question on factual knowledge that are asked during recurring 
election studies. Besides the element of photo recognition, different versions of the DPES 
contain varying questions that measure other forms of factual political knowledge. For 
example, the 1998 DPES includes questions that asks respondents on several occasions which 
party at that moment has more seats in comparison to other parties (DPES 1998), while such 
a question is missing in the 2002 DPES. Instead, the 2002 DPES asked respondents to 
correctly determine the number of seats each of the six parties that were prospected to 
become largest in the next election. Although both types of questions are indeed 
measurements of factual knowledge, utilizing them into a scale of factual knowledge presents 
a problem. First, the two measurements of factual knowledge are not comparable simply 
because of the fact that both type of questions do not appear in both studies. This results in an 
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inconsistent measurement of political awareness that could lead to a skewed distribution of 
political awareness over time. Second, the 1998 question obviously offers a lot more 
bandwidth for respondents to give a correct answer in comparison to the 2002 questions, 
simply because of the fact that much less information has to be correctly recalled when 
comparing two parties in size as opposed to correctly assessing the amount of representatives 
each party has in parliament. Again, the lack of comparability of these questions prevents the 
proper utilization of these questions in the creation of a scale that measures political 
awareness.  
Unfortunately, the 2003 DPES does not include such a measurement. Because of the 
fact that the elections of 2003 were held only 7 months after the elections in 2002, there was 
a lack of resources, both in time as well as financial, to conduct a full election study. Instead, 
participants of the 2002 post-election wave were invited to participate in a 2003 post-election 
wave. A total of 1287 respondents participated, and an extra 1271 participants were newly 
added to the 2003 sample (Irwin et al., 2005:8). The main focus of the DPES of 2003 was on 
collecting panel data. This means that for the 1271 newly added respondents questions on 
political knowledge are not available. Furthermore, most demographic data such as (years of) 
education is missing. Because of the absence of this data, it is seemingly impossible to 
construct another scale that allows for a measurement of political awareness.  
However, to turn a negative aspect into a positive one, this does allow a panel test on 
the theory of Zaller. If only the 1287 participants of both waves are being taken into account, 
48.7% of the respondents initially favored adjustment to Dutch culture, whereas in 2003 
39.2% of the same respondents held this opinion. The mean of the responses of the 
respondents who participated in 2002 and in 2003 differed from each other at a significant 
level (paired t-test, t(1273) = 5.306, p < 0.001). Because the significant change in public 
opinion happened over a period of only eight months and the mere fact that the opinion of 
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these respondents became less conservative in comparison to the change in opinion between 
1998 and 2002 makes it even more relevant to look into the panel data. 
Political predispositions are, as previously described, operationalized as self-
placement on a left to right scale. Respondents are asked to determine to which extend their 
opinions can be considered left or right. This measurement of left right does not confine itself 
to a specific dimension of a left-right distribution (i.e. economic or cultural). This rating is 
measured by the question in the DPES that asked respondents to place themselves on a scale 
from left to right. 
Media coverage is operationalized as the amount of media coverage starting from six 
months prior to each election. The previously mentioned pro-Islam and anti-Islam frames are 
the sum of the five different frames that were identified by Vliegenthart (Vliegenthart and 
Roggeband, 2007). The frames that made up to sum the pro-Islam frame are the multicultural 
frame and the emancipation frame. The first frames emphasizes the importance of cultural 
diversity, whereas the second frame recognizes the importance of different cultural groups to 
be emancipated from the state and participate in society in their own cultural setting. The 
anti-Islam frame is constructed out of an Islam-as-a-threat frame, a restriction frame and a 
victimization frame. The first frame identifies the Islam as a threat to Dutch and Western 
culture and demands Islamic immigrants to adjust. The restriction frame identifies problems 
with the immigration of non-western “newcomers”, both from a viewpoint of economic 
dependence as well as the fact that these immigrants are perceived as having a “traditional 
non-emancipated orientation” (Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007:301). The victimization 
frame sees mainly women as oppressed actors in the Islamic community. These women 
should be liberated through emancipation and freed from oppressive symbols such as a 
headscarf. (see Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007:300-302 for a complete description of all 
frames). 
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The period of six months is chosen on the fact that this period provides the tests with an even 
distribution of time periods prior to each elections. This could also be accomplished by 
choosing a shorter period, but the period of six months increases the likelihood that all 
relevant messages are taken into account. 
The dependent variable of opinion change is operationalized by recoding the DPES 
question that asked respondents if non-western immigrants should adjust to Dutch Culture. 
Answer were given on a 7 point scale ranging from “preserve cultural customs”, 
corresponding with a value of 1 to “completely adjust to Dutch culture” with a value of 7. 
This variable is recoded into a trichotomous variable in which the values 5, 6 and 7 are 
recoded as respondents who are conservative, i.e. in favor of non-western immigrants to 
completely adjust to Dutch culture. Respondents who gave a value of 1,2 and 3 are recoded 
as progressive respondents, i.e. in favor of non-western immigrants to preserve their own 
cultural values. Respondents who responded with the center position, i.e. 4, are recoded into 
the center positions. In the utilization of the dependent variable in the panel comparison 
between 2002 and 2003, the original opinion values will be used. 
 
3.2 Methods 
Based on the operationalization, the full statistical model with all variables will be reviewed.  
As was stated before, in his 1996 revision of the RAS model, Zaller simplified the 
mathematical form of the model. Incorporating a monocultural and a multicultural message, 
the next equation describes the probability that a certain type of voter will have changed to an 
opinion in line with messages adhering to a monocultural society. This equation has the same 
general form as equation 2.  
 (      )   
 
                                                
 
  (  (
 
                                                    
)) 
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 (Eq. 3)  
In this equation, the different variables and their parameters are shown. The equation in 
equation 3 describes the likelihood of a change in opinion towards favoring non-western 
immigrants to adjust to Dutch culture. This is done by calculating the likelihood that an 
individual would have such a monocultural opinion. This is multiplied by 1 minus the 
likelihood that such an individual would have a multicultural opinion. In order to determine 
the likelihood that an individual would have an opinion in favor of non-western immigrants 
to preserve their own cultural customs, the reverse process is employed. This means that first 
the likelihood that an individual would have such a multicultural opinion is calculated. This 
result is multiplied by 1 minus the likelihood that such an individual would have a 
monocultural opinion. The parameters in the model are as following: Parameter b0 indicates 
an intercept parameter, b1 the effect of awareness on accepting a monocultural message, b2 
the effect of predispositions to persuasion to the monocultural message, and b3  the effect of 
media usage on the loudness of a monocultural message. The parameters in double digits 
represent the effect of the same variables for the reverse situation, i.e. a multicultural message 
and corresponding opinion. 
 In his application of the actual model, Zaller derives the different parameters by 
applying a maximum likelihood regression in which political awareness and party attachment 
are utilized as explanatory variables. This proposal intends to utilize political awareness, left-
right self-placement and the number of media frames as independent variables in a maximum 
likelihood regression to obtain parameters b0, b00, b1, b11, b2, b22, b3 and b33.  
The model also takes previous opinions into account. Obviously, in order to assess the 
probability that a certain type of voter will have a certain opinion a time T1, the likelihood 
that a certain type of individual would have already had that previous opinion should be taken 
into account as well. The probability that a certain type of voter individual will hold opinion i 
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at time (T2) then becomes a combination of two probabilities of opinion change functions, 
both at time (T1) and time (T2) (Zaller, 1992:134-140; Zaller, 1996:70-72). Or as to quote 
Zaller:  
“The probability of holding a particular opinion at time t + 1 is the probability of 
holding it at the baseline period, plus the probability of converting to the opinion if not 
already holding it at time t”  (Zaller, 1992:141). 
 
This means that the likelihood of change towards another opinion is the likelihood of change 
towards that opinion at T2, subtracting the likelihood that that type of individual already 
would have held that opinion at T1. The likelihood that a type individual would have a certain 
opinion at time T1 is the baseline. 
This baseline is determined as the outcome of the function described in eq. 3 at time 
T1 (Zaller, 1992:140). It is fair to say that this approach ideally suggests the use of panel data. 
Unfortunately, such data is not available most of the time. One of the main contributions of 
this lack of available data is that the RAS model is an attempt to described changes in public 
opinion without the availability of such panel data. Because of this, the RAS model uses 
separate waves of respondents.  
Based on this assumption, the likelihood that a type of voter will have a certain 
opinion at time (t+1) is described as: 
 
 (       )     (        )   (      )  (   (        ) ) 
(eq. 4) 
To test the first hypothesis, the method as prescribed by equation 4 is employed. This 
method is most similar to the method Zaller used in 1996 (see Zaller, 1996:69-73 for a full 
explanation). This method involved the creation of baseline functions, based on equation 3, 
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for both the progressive and conservative positions on integration of non-western immigrants 
in every DPES. This means that six baseline functions will be created (both monocultural and 
multicultural for 1998, 2002 and 2003). These baseline functions are then combined into four 
functions that describe the probability of opinion change for each of the two positions. These 
four functions describe the likelihood of monocultural 1998 to 2002 and from 2002 to 2003 
as well as the likelihood of individuals changing their opinions to a multicultural position for 
the same two time periods. These functions are a combination of the baseline function 
described with equation 3 and the likelihood of changes in opinion based on equation 4.  An 
example, in which the likelihood of change towards the opinion that non-western immigrants 
should adjust to Dutch culture is presented below in equation 5. In this example the 
likelihood of a monocultural position in 1998 as well as the likelihood of change towards that 
positions in 2002 is calculated by the usage of equation 3. These calculations are then 
combined to provide a likelihood that an individual changed towards a conservative opinion 
in 2002.  
 
 (    )      (    )      (      )     (   (    )    ) 
(eq. 5) 
The results of these functions will be tested by the maximum likelihood non-linear regression 
to assess the ability of the model to predict opinion change for certain types of voters 
depending on political awareness. In order to test the second hypothesis same process will be 
repeated with the introduction of a new variable: Political predispositions. 
 As noted in the case selection, the 2002 and 2003 DPES allows for a panel study. This 
allows for an examination of the variables that make up the RAS model and see how they 
perform in predicting changes in opinion for unique individuals over time. The dependent 
variable will be the opinion respondents expressed in the 2003 DPES on the question to what 
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extent non-western immigrants should adjust to Dutch culture. The response to this question 
given by the respondents in the 2002 DPES will be included as an independent variable. This 
means that the dependent variable will be lagged. The argument to incorporate the responses 
of the 2002 DPES is analogue to the argument, described above, by Zaller. The likelihood of 
having a certain opinion on time t+1 also dependent on respondents having such opinions on 
time t. Because of the distribution of the dependent variable, linear regression will be used to 
determine the influence of political awareness and political predispositions on the change in 
opinion. 
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4 Results 
 
A requirement in the RAS model is to determine whether or not there is an observable change 
in the both the saliency of an issue in the media and the way in which the subject is 
communicated. As can be seen in figure two, this is the case.  
Until September 2001, the amount of reporting on the issue of Islam is quite stable. 
Both the pro- and anti-Islam frames receive an equal amount of attention in the media and the 
total amount of attention almost never rises above the level of 100 counts per month. Data is 
available starting in 1995, but the pattern between 1995 and 1998 is generally the same. The 
sudden rise in media attention in September 2001 to the anti-Islam frame is most likely due to 
the terrorist attack of September 11
th
. According to Vliegenthart, such an increase is to be 
expected, since the events of September 11
th
 lead to a shift in paradigm resulting in the 
abandonment of old frames and the introduction of frames that were previously almost 
unused (Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007:299). 
 
 
Figure 2: Frame count 
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January of 2002, that attention started to fade. It however showed a fierce revival in 
September of 2002. The important difference is that the content of the Islam-as-a-threat frame 
as was communicated in 2001 differs from that in 2002. Obviously, the frames in 2001 were 
predominantly concerned with the attacks of September 11
th
. In 2002 however, the issues that 
have been reported in the newspapers hit much more close to home. Former Somalia refugee 
and member of the Dutch socialist party, Ms. Ayaan Hirsi Ali expressed a very critical 
opinion on the Islam during the 10
th
 and 11
th
 of September of 2002 (Hippe et al., 2004:143), 
for which she was threatened. The events surrounding the opinion expressed by Ms. Hirshi 
Ali received a significant amount of media attention.  
For as far the first significant increase in the usage of anti-Islamic frames goes, one could 
argue that since the events of September 11
th
 2001 are not related to a tangible domestic 
problem within the Netherlands, since the threat did not manifest itself in the Netherlands. 
This could mean that the effects of those communications could be regarded as negligible and 
because of such a possibility could be excluded. However, based on the events of September 
11
th
 and the amount of news related to those events, it is only fair to include those frames, 
since the events of September 11
th
 clearly resulted in a change in the dominant media 
message (Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007:299).  Furthermore, the RAS model 
hypothesizes that the continued usage of a frame increases the likelihood of a change in 
public opinion further. This argues in favor of including the frame. For the sake of providing 
full information: If we exclude these events, the first two substantial increases in anti-Islam 
communication can be reduced to roughly the same amount of pro-Islam communication at 
that time. However, the frames did make it into the newspapers at that moment and as such 
contributed to the amount of information individuals were likely to receive on these 
messages.  
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4.1 Change in public opinion 
Figure 3 shows the graph with the percentages of respondents in the DPES samples of 1998, 
2002 and 2003 who answered in favor of non-western immigrants to adjust to Dutch culture 
distributed along their levels of political awareness. 
The first observation to be made is that there seems to be a negative linear pattern 
between the level of political awareness that is displayed and the percentage of respondents 
who answered to be in favor of non-western immigrants adjust to Dutch culture.  This 
observation is confirmed by a simple bivariate test for correlation. In 1998 and 2003, the 
correlation between political awareness and the respondents favoring non-western 
immigrants to adjust to Dutch culture was significant at the 0.01 level, but the relationship 
was weak at most, 1998: r(2101) = -0.132, p < 0.01; 2003: r(1285) = -0.175, p < 0.01. The 
two variables correlated even less in 2002, and displayed a lower level of significance, 
r(1895) = -0.049, p < 0.05.  
 
 
Figure 3: Percentage adjust to Dutch culture 
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Looking at figure 4, there seems to be a positive linear relationship between the percentage of 
individuals who responded that non-western immigrants should be allowed to preserve their 
own customs. The correlation was significant in all three elections, however, the correlation 
again was weak at most. 1998 reported a correlation of 0.100, r(2101) = 0.100, p < 0.01. The 
data of the 2002 DPES displayed an even weaker correlation, r(1895) = 0.080, p < 0.01. The 
2003 DPES data provided the largest correlation, albeit very weak: r(1285) = 0.133, p < 0.01. 
 
Figure 4: Percentage preserve own culture 
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In this calculation, the percentage of respondents who scored a certain level of political 
awareness and were in favor of one of three possible positions in 1998 are regarded as T1, 
while respondents in 2002 with the same level of political awareness who were in favor of the 
same position are regarded as T2. This calculation provides a relative changes in opinion 
based on political awareness for a certain position from 1998 to 2002. 
The solid line describes the percentage of respondents that changed from an opinion in 
which they favored preserving own cultural customs, or had a center opinion, towards an 
opinion opposing that cultural diversity. The narrow dotted line shows the opposite 
movement. Finally, the wide dotted line shows the proportion of change in the center group, 
people who felt evenly strong on both opinions. 
 
Figure 5: Opinion change 1998 to 2002 
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an own culture is not as large as its opposite counterpart, the change itself is highly 
significant. In the period from 1998 to 2002, the mean change rate of respondents who 
favored non-western immigrants to preserve their own customs was -11,8%, which was 
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significant t(25) = -6.595, p < 0.001.  The change in the proportion of people who expressed a 
neutral opinion is highly significant as well, with a change rate of -8,9%,  t(25) = -6.981, p < 
0.001.  
Figure 3 up to and including figure 5 present a partial answer to the first hypothesis. At a 
first glance, the changes in opinion do not occur according to a clear non-linear pattern based 
on political awareness. Instead, the change in opinion seems to follow a linear pattern. 
Furthermore, the slope of the linear pattern does not seem to be that steep, which would mean 
that political knowledge does not moderate a change in opinion.  
 
Figure 6: Opinion change 2002 to 2003 
 
 
Figure 6, in which we see the proportion of change in public opinion in the period between 
the elections in 2002 until the elections in 2003, also seems to lack a non-linear pattern based 
on political awareness. This means that figure 6 provides similar results in comparison to 
figure 5. The only hint of a possible non-linear pattern is provided by the curve that describes 
the proportion of respondents whose opinion changed towards a position favoring the 
adjustment to Dutch culture. However, the sample of respondents that scored 2 on the scale 
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describing political awareness expressed a 50% negative change rate in the opinion favoring 
adjustment to Dutch culture. Does this group of respondents represent an outlier? The amount 
of respondents in the sample is roughly evenly distributed along the spectrum of political 
awareness, with the number of respondents with a score of 2 on political knowledge making 
up around 6% of the sample. This means that the respondents who scored 2 on the scale of 
political awareness are at least not over- or underrepresented at first sight. Furthermore, 
looking at the number of frames that have been transmitted, it shows that the anti-Islamic 
frame at the time of the 2003 elections could still be seen as the dominant media frame. 
Although the graphs in figure 2 show that there was an increase in the amount of pro-Islamic 
frames that have been transmitted prior to the 2003 elections, the RAS model prescribes that 
only those who are highly attentive to political news, meaning those respondents who 
generally score high on a scale that captures political awareness, should have picked this 
increase in the countervailing media message up. This outlier as such seems to be not in line 
with the RAS model. 
 The others lines in figure 6 show the same general pattern as those in figures 4 and 5. 
As far as there is a relationship between political awareness and the changes in public 
opinion, the relationship is foremost one that can at best be described by a linear pattern. 
Second, insofar that one is able to see a pattern between political awareness and a change in 
opinion, the relationship between these two variables is most of all generally very weak.  
Although the forecast for a fit of the model does not look that good, in order to actually 
test hypothesis H1 it is necessary to estimate the model.
 
The model that has been estimated is 
the first model that can be found in the appendix.  
The model starts off with the calculation of the baseline for the years 1998, 2002 and 
2003 on the respondents who favored or opposed non-western immigrants to preserve their 
own customs. The calculations that are performed to obtain the baselines are based on the 
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first half of equation 3. This means for example that in order to obtain the baseline 
probability of opinions in favor of non-western immigrants in 1998, the model parameters  b0 
until b2 are used to determine the influence of political awareness and the amount of media 
content in support of preserving non-western cultural values, as explained in the methods 
section. The process is repeated to obtain the 1998 baseline probability that respondents had 
the opinion that non-western immigrants should adjust to Dutch culture.  
To test the first hypothesis, the model was run without a variable to distinguish on 
political predispositions. In order to assess correct values for the parameters that are to be 
assessed by the model, it is necessary to obtain values for these parameters that “make 
sense”. Zaller argues that the process of obtaining plausible parameters is an estimation 
technique that is quite difficult (Zaller, 1992:150). For researchers not as experienced with 
such a procedure, Zaller suggests to usage of spreadsheets in order to obtain meaningful 
parameters. This was done by placing all the relevant data for one year in one spreadsheet. 
This resulted in a spreadsheet with a column for political awareness, a column that held the 
dummy variable for respondents who favored non-western immigrants to preserve their own 
customs, and a column containing the dummy variable for respondents who favored non-
western immigrants adjust to Dutch culture. Furthermore, two columns containing the count 
of pro- and anti-Islamic frames, were added.  
By using the first half of equation 3, the baseline functions were layered over a curve that 
represented the actual proportion of respondents corresponding with either one of the recoded 
opinions. For each of the two baseline functions, the parameters for the model were changed 
so that the resulting baseline curve would approximate the actual proportion of respondents 
favoring either one of the two positions. Starting with values provided by Zaller (1992:150), 
this method of estimation eventually led to the parameters that can be found in the first 
column of table 1.  
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The single digit parameters are the 
parameters that are used in the model 
to assess the fit of the model on 
determining the likelihood that, based 
on political awareness, an individual 
would change his opinion so that he 
would adhere to the position of non-
western immigrants needing to adept to 
Dutch culture. The parameters with a 
double-digit suffix are related to the 
opposite process. The a0 and a1 (and of 
course the a00 and a11) are the parameters concerned with describing the baseline opinion, 
prior to the 1998 elections. These parameters affect the same variables as parameters b0 and 
b1. However, these parameters are used to determine the initial levels of support for either 
opinions, i.e. the baselines.  
Parameter b0 is the intercept parameter of every sub function. Parameters b1 and b2 
describe the influence of political awareness on the one hand and the amount of media frames 
on the other hand.    
The parameter values that are provided in the second and third column of table 1 show the 
result of multiple iterations in which the model was estimated based on the parameters that 
have been obtained according to the method described above. The obtained residual sum of 
squares (R
2
) is the residual of the model in comparison to a horizontal line that equals 0
2
.  
As could be expected from the raw data, it was unlikely that this estimation would 
provide us with estimates to support H1. After estimating the model multiple times, the 
                                                 
2
 The horizontal line in the model is the variable in the appendix described by var0. 
Table 1: Model parameters                                                                                                                        
 Preserve own culture   
Intercept (a0) 1 5.6 5.5 
Awareness (a1) 2 0.4 0.4 
Intercept (b0) 0.8 3.1 0 
Awareness (b1) -5 -0.75 -0.75 
Preserve media (b2) 0 0 0 
  
  
  
Adjust to Dutch culture   
Intercept (a00) -1 2.1 2.1 
Awareness (a11) -2 -0.42 -0.42 
Intercept (b00) -0.8 1 -0.8 
Awareness (b11) 5 1 5 
Adjust media (b22) 0 0 0 
  
  
  
Residual sum of squares (R
2
) -2074 -1039 -35 
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results showed that the model was unable to provide an explanation for the probabilities of 
changes in public opinion dependent on political awareness. This can be best seen in the 
summed R
2
 value. The results show this value to be negative. This can be explained as the 
model being less able to predict the probabilities of change in opinion in comparison to the 
straight line that has been defined by var0. Due to the iterative nature of non-linear 
regression, different parameter values were provided by the program as the model was 
estimated. Attempts of obtaining such values as a result of subsequent iterations can be seen 
in column two and three of table 1. Altering the parameters in subsequent iterations improves 
the fit of the model in reference to the straight line. However, the model seems never to be 
able to explain changes in public opinion better than that straight line. Based on these results 
we can only conclude that there is no support for H1 in this case.  
  
 
4.3 Hypothesis 2: Political predispositions 
Although political awareness is a crucial component of the RAS model, political 
predispositions are also necessary in order to test the full model. Incorporating political 
predispositions allows for an enhancement of the model according to the theory. The theory 
describes that respondents who are predisposed against a new dominant media message are 
less likely to change their opinion in comparison to those types of individuals who based on 
their political predispositions are likely to adhere to such a message.  
 In order to test the influence of political predispositions, the question on the DPES in 
which respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale from left to right was recoded 
so that it represented three categories: left, center and right. The decision to utilize this 
division was based on the number of respondents within each category. If the scale that was 
used in the DPES studies would have been adopted, it would have resulted in a situation in 
which multiple categories would include no respondents. Using a left-center-right distribution 
provided around 10 respondents per category.  
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 Based on the breakdown on political predispositions, left to right self-placement and 
the opinion respondents provided, there are more figures like the graphs in figure 7 available. 
However, these graphs all display similar results as described in the previous paragraph , i.e. 
linear patterns of changes in public opinion based on political awareness. Based on this 
determination, these graphs are not presented because they do not provide any new insight. 
  
 
Figure 7: Change rate based on political predispositions 
 
 
The lines in figure 7 show the change rates for the respondents change rates towards the 
opinion that non-western immigrants should adjust to Dutch culture. The lines are group by 
the division in political predispositions.  
The rates of changes in the period from 1998 to 2002 was selected to be presented in this 
chapter based on two reasons. First of all, the change in opinion was larger in the period from 
1998 to 2002 then it was for the period between 2002 and 2003. Second of all, the graph in 
figure 7 for respondents who placed themselves on the left shows a slightly non-linear 
pattern, with a clear drop in change rate on the low and high end of the political awareness 
spectrum and a peak within the respondents who scored moderately on the political 
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awareness scale. This visual inspection of the data thus provides some possibility that the 
RAS model is able to explain the change in public opinion between 1998 and 2002. 
At first sight, the curve for respondents who identify with the left seems to follow an 
inverse quadratic pattern, and such an non-linear relationship between political awareness and 
changes in public opinion are in line with the RAS model. The biggest change towards the 
opinion that non-western immigrants should adjust to Dutch culture in the period from 1998 
to 2002 is found among those types of individuals who displayed to have average levels of 
political awareness.  
At the same time, it is unlikely that this pattern fits the RAS model. Based on the 
change rates, those types of individuals who consider them to be ideologically left and score 
low on political awareness show a decline in the likelihood of changing to the opinion of 
adjusting to Dutch Culture. This observation seems to be in contradiction with the RAS 
model. The high numbers of media frames, especially those that can be seen as anti-Islamic 
are likely to be so intense that it is likely that these messages would have reached even those 
types of voters who can be labeled politically unaware.  Upon receiving such messages, the 
RAS model describes that it is likely that these types of voters would have changed their 
opinion accordingly. This would mean that these types of voters should have displayed a 
change towards the opinion that non-western immigrants should adjust to Dutch culture. 
Based on this assessment of the visual data, it seems unlikely that H2 can be confirmed.  
In order to estimate the model, the variable containing political predispositions was 
added to the model. Adding political predisposition obviously results in the addition of two 
parameters in the model, each describing the effect of political predispositions. One 
parameter explaining the effect of political predispositions on changes in opinion in favor of 
non-western immigrants preserving their own customs and one opposing that opinion. These 
are the parameters described in table 2 as b3 and b33.   
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 Results for the non-linear 
regression are displayed in table two. 
As was the case with estimating the 
model without political 
predispositions, the model was unable 
to perform better explain the change 
in opinion in comparison to the 
horizontal line. This again can be 
concluded based on the negative 
residual sum of squares. It should 
however be mentioned that the 
obtained negative residual was much 
lower in comparison to the residuals obtained in the test that only used political awareness. 
This means that the model including political predispositions is better able to explain the 
changes in opinion in comparison to the model that did not include political predispositions. 
However, even with the addition of political predisposition, the model was unsuccessful in 
providing a better explanation of the change in public opinion based on political awareness 
and political predispositions when compared to a horizontal line. Based on these observations 
it is justified to conclude that there is no support for H2 in this case. 
4.4 Alternative test: panel data            
Although in this case the RAS model seems to be unable to explain any of the changes in 
opinion, the fact remains that there were significant changes in opinion expressed between 
the participants of the different elections studies. Due to the short time, and limits on 
resources, between the 2002 and 2003 Dutch parliamentary elections, the 2003 DPES is a 
Table 2: Model parameters                                                                                                                        
 Preserve own culture       
Intercept (a0) 10 6.5 5.6 
Awareness (a1) 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Intercept (b0) 3 3 3.1 
Awareness (b1) -1 -0.75 -0.75 
Preserve media (b2) 0 0 0 
Predispositions (b3) -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
  
  
  
Adjust to Dutch culture    
Intercept (a00) 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Awareness (a11) -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 
Intercept (b00) 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Awareness (b11) 1 1 1 
Adjust media (b22) 0 0 0 
Predispositions (b33) 0.1 0.1 0.1 
  
  
  
Residual sum of squares (R
2
) -61 -11.95 -0.94 
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continuation of the DPES held in 2002. The availability of panel data allows to see if any of 
the variables that were asked to respondents were of influence on changes in opinion. 
Based on panel data, an alternative test is to try to identify to what extend political awareness 
and  political predispositions were of influence on the change in opinion previously 
described. Keep in mind that the opinion expressed by respondents who participated in both 
the 2002 and 2003 DPES significantly changed towards a more progressive opinion in 2003, 
whereas opinions became more conservative from 1998 and 2002. 
As was previously mentioned in the methods section, the dependent variable for this 
test is the opinion expressed towards the question if non-western immigrants should adjust to 
Dutch culture or be allowed to preserve their own customs. The scale of the variable ranges 
from 1 to 7, with one being the position that non-western immigrants should be completely 
allowed to preserve their own customs and consequently 7 meaning that respondents felt that 
non-western immigrants should completely adjust to Dutch culture. The actual question that 
is used as a dependent variable is the question on this subject that has been asked in the 2003 
DPES. This choice of variable leads provides the used analysis technique to determine the 
contribution of political predispositions and political awareness on the change in public 
opinion. Because the dependent variable is a scale ranging from 1 to 7, linear regression will 
be employed.  
The same question that was previously asked in the 2002 DPES is used as an independent 
variable in order to create a lagged dependent variable. This allows to see the contribution of 
previously held opinions on the subject in comparison to the opinions that the respondents 
expressed in 2003. The RAS model also takes the influence of previously held opinions on an 
issue into account. Adding the opinions expressed by the respondents in the 2002 DPES then 
becomes a logical step. Public opinion in 2002 is operationalized in the same way as public 
opinion on the issue in 2003.  
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The variable on political predispositions was in the application of the RAS model 
recoded as a trichotomous variable due to practical reasons. Because this linear regression 
analysis does not require a breakdown based on political awareness and political 
predispositions, the variable was not altered before it was entered into the regression. 
The influence of media messages is a somewhat more problematic. Because the 
number of media messages is not an individual level variable, incorporating the total number 
of media frames would provide no variance and as such would be unable to contribute as a 
possible explanatory variable. Instead of a count of media frames, a measurement of habitual 
news consumption is added to the variable. This is variable is an additive scale that consists 
out of questions on how many national newspapers respondents read and how often they 
watch news on television. For every newspaper a respondents reports to read, a value of 1 is 
awarded. Questions on the consumption of news on television range on a four point scale 
from almost never to daily. Respondents reporting to watch the news on television on a daily 
basis were given a value of 1. Respondents reporting to watch the news 3 to 4 times a week 
were given a value of 2/3. Respondents reporting to watch the news 1 to 2 times a week were 
given a value of 1/3 and respondents reporting to almost never watch the news on television 
were given a value of 0. All scores were added up to create the scale of habitual news 
consumption.  
A final variable that is added as an independent variable is party adherence. This is 
based on the observation that the extent to which an individual displays adherence to political 
party is a shown to be of strong influence on the opinion a voter has (Ray, 2003:993), but at 
the same time is a quite stable variable over time (Johnston, 2006:347-348). For all of the 
nine biggest parties
3
, a dummy variable is utilized and then added to the regression.  
                                                 
3
 These parties are PvdA, CDA, VVD, D66, GroenLinks, SGP, Christen Unie, LPF and SP. 
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Respondents were able to adhere to multiple parties in their responses. As such 
adherence is not the same as actual voting preference. 
 
The results of the linear regression can be found in table 3. As could be expected, the 
independent variable that contains the opinion respondents had in 2002 is a strong significant 
predictor on the opinion held by respondents in 2003.  
  Political awareness is also a highly significant predictor, albeit that the contribution of 
the variable is only very modest. Political predispositions shows to be a significant predictor 
of the change in opinion as well. Furthermore, the contribution of political predispositions on 
the changes in public opinion in 2003 are positively associated with respondents who identify 
themselves with the right. In that same line of reasoning, adhering to political party 
GroenLinks is a significant negative predictor for an opinion in favor of non-western 
immigrants to completely adjust to Dutch culture. This results however should not come as a 
Table 3: Change in opinion on 2003 DPES     
  B SE B β 
Constant 2.162** 0.369   
2002 Opinion 0.448** 0.024 0.471 
Political awareness -0.045** 0.010 -0.103 
Political predispositions 0.120** 0.020 0.164 
Habitual news consumption 0.118* 0.051 0.053 
No party Adherence -0.057 0.166 -0.019 
PvdA Adherence -0.034 0.168 -0.007 
CDA Adherence 0.139 0.165 0.030 
VVD Adherence -0.005 0.181 -0.001 
D66 Adherence -0.330 0.229 -0.037 
GroenLinks Adherence -0.368* 0.186 -0.053 
SGP Adherence 0.109 0.391 0.007 
Christen Unie Adherence 0.076 0.239 0.009 
LPF Adherence 0.409 0.247 0.044 
SP Adherence -0.102 0.267 -0.010 
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.392, N = 1213, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01     
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surprise. On a scale from 0 to 9, with 0 representing the left and 9 representing the right, the 
left-right placement for GroenLinks by respondents of the 2002 DPES had a mean value of 
3.31 (SD=1.46). In the opinion of respondents GroenLinks is regarded as a party on the 
political left. All other parties provided no significant contribution in predicting a change in 
public opinion in this case.  
 The variable habitual news usage also showed to be a significant positive predictor in 
change in public opinion in this case. The more respondents read newspapers and looked at 
televised news, the more likely they are to have an opinion that non-western immigrants 
should adjust to Dutch culture. Since the total amount of anti-Islamic frames still was larger 
than the total amount of pro-Islamic frames, this observation provides some support for the 
idea that the rise in the absolute number of anti-Islamic frames in the media was of influence 
on the change in opinion in this case.  
 Overall, the model has an R
2
 value of 0.396 meaning that these independent variables 
are able to account for almost 40% of the variance in the opinion towards the question if non-
western immigrants should adhere to Dutch culture or be allowed to preserve their own 
customs.  
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5 Conclusion and discussion 
 
Based on the results that were obtained by testing the two formulated hypotheses there is only 
one conclusion that can be drawn: The RAS model showed to be unable to provide any 
explanation for the expressed change in public opinion in this case.  
Most striking in this case seems to be the observation that the changes do not follow a 
non-linear pattern, but are most notably linear. The availability of panel data in this case 
provided a unique opportunity to determine the contribution of political awareness and 
political predispositions on the expressed change in public opinion. The panel data allowed to 
test if any of the variables based on the RAS model, provide any explanatory power. In the 
subsequent linear regression performed on this panel data, the contribution of political 
awareness and political predispositions have shown to both be highly significant predictors of  
the opinion respondents expressed during the 2003 DPES. However, political awareness 
showed to provide only a limited prediction in this case.  
There are however some possibilities that could have played a factor in the inability of 
the model to accurately predict the observed change in public opinion. First of all, it could 
have to do with an inaccurate measurement of political awareness. As was previously 
mentioned, the different election studies only utilize photo recognition questions as a 
consistent measurement of factual knowledge about politician. There are no other factual 
questions available, for example on the constitutional role of the cabinet, parliament, and the 
head of state. Adding such questions on future parliamentary election studies could very well 
provide more variance on variables that can be labeled as political knowledge or political 
awareness. Furthermore, it could very well be the case that the measurements that are used in 
the DPES to create a scale for political knowledge were unable to distinguish between those 
who can be regarded political sophisticates and those who cannot be granted such a label. 
Based on the photo recognition questions that have been used, the same problem could have 
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existed as it did in the 1980’s (Irwin et al., 2005). Almost every respondent was able to 
correctly answer the photo recognition questions due to the fact that only party leaders were 
used. Something similar could be happening with the photo recognition questions at this 
moment. In 2002, for every politician that was presented to respondents, every politician 
yielded a correct percentage of answers of around 85% of the respondents. Furthermore, in 
the 2002 DPES, there were 216 respondents who scored the maximum score on political 
knowledge, while only 60 respondents obtained the lowest possible score. Based on the usage 
of the measurement of political knowledge to represent political awareness, the largest 
portion of the population seems to be highly knowledgeable based on these numbers. The 
addition of other questions, probing for other bits of factual information such as “which 
parties make up the current coalition”  or “who is the chairman of the Second Chamber” and 
“is the Queen a member of the government” could increase the variance on the scale of 
political knowledge. 
 Another possibility could lie in the way the frames have been counted. The Islamic 
frames might have been of negligible influence on the change in opinion towards non-
western immigrants. A final observation could be that the time period between the 1998 and 
2002 elections was too big to capture the influence of media frames on a change in public 
opinion. One downside of the usage of these frames was that the data used in this method 
provided little variance on the issue between the different time periods. In order to better 
determine the effect of media frames, more variance on this variable should be achieved, This 
can be accomplished by using more points in time in which public opinion is measured on a 
certain issue.  
 The usage of left right self-placement as political predispositions seemed to perform 
quite good as a predictor to change in opinion in this case, as well as previously held opinions 
were. These two observations are in line with the general assumptions of the RAS model, that 
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predispositions and previously held opinions influence the likelihood that a respondent will 
change his opinion on a certain case. However, as was noted before, the RAS model itself 
was unable to provide an explanation for the observed change in opinion in this case. The 
same can be said on the number of anti-Islamic frames in the media. The scale that was 
created to provide a value for the habitual news reception of respondents showed to be a 
positive significant predictor for a change in opinion towards the position that non-western 
immigrants should adjust to Dutch culture. In combination with the observation that the 
number of anti-Islamic frames that were transmitted in newspapers were larger than the 
amount of pro-Islamic frames, the significant contribution of habitual news usage could be 
regarded as a clue that the changes in opinion expressed by respondents in this case correlates 
with the number of frames expressed on the issue. However, it could very well be that the 
direction of causality is the other way around, i.e. that the media reports on public opinion 
instead of public opinion being influenced by the media. 
Is resistance then futile? Looking at the RAS model, the results that have been obtained 
in this case suggest that an answer to this question ambiguous. According to the RAS model 
those respondents that can be seen as politically aware should have been able to resist the 
message. However, even these types of individuals expressed the same change in public 
opinion. The strength of the message, represented by the total number of frames, political 
awareness and political predispositions were in this case, according to the RAS model, unable 
to provide an explanation for the observed change in opinion. Based on the observation that 
that changes in opinion, seen as dependent on political awareness, followed a linear pattern 
that shows little variation, one can say that the observed change in opinion affects the 
complete population with even strength. As such, the change in opinion seems to have been 
felt among the complete population. The observation that political sophistication does not 
lead to a resistance to changes in public opinion in accordance with the RAS model is an 
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observation that is in line with the results obtained by Goren (2004). In this study it was 
demonstrated that respondents who scored high on scales measuring political awareness, not 
necessarily are more able to resist new issue positions. Instead, respondents were shown to 
change their opinion primarily in accordance with their prior beliefs. Goren concludes that 
the interaction between political awareness and resistance to political information “does not 
apply as broadly as the conventional wisdom presumes” (Goren, 2004:474). 
As always, more research is needed to address these questions. The elements that were 
formulated by Zaller, political awareness, political predispositions and message reception, 
still come up as significant predictors for changes in opinion as was demonstrated in the 
regression on the panel data. However the contribution of political awareness was, although 
highly significant, overall very low.  
As was previously noted, a wider measurement of political awareness could provide 
more variance and as such provide more insight in the contribution of the variable to changes 
in public opinion. Testing the RAS model on a change in public opinion that occurs in a 
relatively short period of time could provide more insight in the role that political awareness 
and political predispositions have in such changes. This can be done for example by 
employing a panel over a period of a few weeks in accordance with a change in public 
opinion. Such a panel study should incorporate more questions to measure political 
awareness alongside with measurements of likely factors that could be regarded as 
predispositions towards the issue. The usage of panel data could allow for a more precise 
assessment on how political awareness influences the likelihood of receiving and 
subsequently accepting a message in combination with the identified predispositions and a 
more accurate count of relevant messages in the media.  
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7 Appendix 
 
The syntax files in this appendix represent the SPSS calculations that have been executed in 
order to test the RAS model. The used syntax is derived from the syntax John Zaller provides 
of the test in change of support for either Gary Hart or Walter Mondale in 1984 Democratic 
primary elections (Zaller, 1996:71). In each of the two syntax files, the same steps are 
executed. The difference between the two syntax files is that to test the first hypothesis, 
political predispositions were left out of the model. This can be seen in the second syntax file 
in which the model parameters b3 and b33 are included as well as the recoded left right self-
placement of the respondents. A short explanation of the variables used in the model is 
provided next. 
 
Var0: This variable represents the horizontal line to which the model is compared.  
Model Parms: These are the initial parameters that were obtained by the explained usage of 
spreapsheets.  
INFO: These are the standardized individual measurements of political awareness that were 
obtained with the photo recognition questions from the different DPES studies. 
PreservemedXXXX: The number of media messages that have been classified as being in 
favor of non-western immigrants to preserve their own customs. XXXX denotes the election 
year for which these messages where counted. 
AdjustmedXXXX: Analogue to Presevermed. Adjustmed is the count of media message in 
favor of non-western immigrants adjusting to Dutch culture. 
RecodedLeftRight:The recoded left right self-placement of the respondents. The higher this 
score, the more a respondents identifies with the right. 
AdjustOpinion: Recoding of the DPES question that asked if respondents thought non-
western immigrants should adjust to Dutch culture of be allowed to preserve their own 
customs, on a scale ranging from 1 to 7. AdjustOpinion contains respondents in favor of non-
western immigrants adjusting to Dutch Culture. These respondents scored 5, 6 or 7 on this 
question. 
PreserveOpinion: Analogue to AdjustOpinion. These respondents scored 1, 2 or 3 on this 
question. 
CenterOpinion: Analogue to AdjustOpinion. These respondents scored 4 on this question. 
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7.1 Model with hypothesis 1 
 
#define reference line and model parameters 
COMPUTE var0=0. 
MODEL PARMS a0=3.1 a00=.5 a1=5.6 a11=2.1 b0=-.75 b1=.4 b2=0 b00=1 b11=-.42  
b22=0. 
 
#Compute baselines 
COMPUTE Preservet0 = 1/(1+exp(-a0-a1*INFO)). 
COMPUTE Adjustt0 = 1/(1+exp(-a00-a11*INFO)). 
COMPUTE Preserve1 = 1/(1+exp(-b0-b1*INFO-b2*preservemed1998)). 
COMPUTE Adjust1 = 1/(1+exp(-b00-b11*INFO-b22*adjustmed1998)). 
COMPUTE Preserve2 = 1/(1+exp(-b0-b1*INFO-b2*preservemed2002)). 
COMPUTE Adjust2 = 1/(1+exp(-b00-b11*INFO-b22*adjustmed2002)). 
COMPUTE Preserve3 = 1/(1+exp(-b0-b1*INFO-b2*preservemed2003)). 
COMPUTE Adjust3 = 1/(1+exp(-b00-b11*INFO-b22*adjustmed2003t)). 
 
#Compute influence gaps 
COMPUTE Preservet1 = Preservet0 + Preserve1 * (1-Adjust1) * (1-Preservet0) - Adjust1 * 
(1-Preserve1) * Preservet0. 
COMPUTE Adjustt1 = Adjustt0 + Adjust1 * (1-Preserve1) * (1-Adjustt0) - Preserve1 * (1 - 
Adjust1) * Adjustt0. 
COMPUTE Preservet2 = Preservet1 + Preserve2 * (1-Adjust2) * (1-Preservet1) - Adjust2 * 
(1-Preserve2) * Preservet1. 
COMPUTE Adjustt2 = Adjustt1 + Adjust2 * (1-Preserve2) * (1-Adjustt1) - Preserve2 * (1 - 
Adjust2) * Adjustt1. 
COMPUTE Preservet3 = Preservet2 + Preserve3 * (1-Adjust3) * (1-Preservet2) - Adjust3 * 
(1-Preserve3) * Preservet2. 
COMPUTE Adjustt3 = Adjustt2 + Adjust3 * (1-Preserve3) * (1-Adjustt3) - Preserve3 * (1 - 
Adjust3) * Adjustt2. 
 
COMPUTE PreserveP = (p1 * Preservet1 + p2 * Preservet2 + p3 * Preservet3). 
COMPUTE AdjustP = (p1 * Adjustt1 + p2 *Adjustt2 + p3 * Adjustt3). 
COMPUTE NoChange = 1 - PreserveP - AdjustP. 
COMPUTE PRED = ((-LG10(PreserveP) * PreserveOpinion - LG10(AdjustP) * 
AdjustOpinion - LG10(NoChange)*CenterOpinion)**.5). 
 
#Test model 
NLR var0 with INFO p1 p2 p3 preservemed1998 adjustmed1998 preservemed2002 
adjustmed2002 preservemed2003 adjustmed2003 PreserveOpinion CenterOpinion 
AdjustOpinion 
  /PRED PRED 
  /CRITERIA SSCONVERGENCE 1E-8 PCON 1E-8. 
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7.2 Model with hypothesis 2 
COMPUTE var0=0. 
MODEL PARMS a0=3.1 a00=.5 a1=5.6 a11=2.1 b0=-.75 b1=.4 b2=0 b3=-.1 b00=1 b11=-
.42  b22=0 b33=.1. 
 
#Compute baselines 
COMPUTE Preservet0 = 1/(1+exp(-a0-a1*INFO)). 
COMPUTE Adjustt0 = 1/(1+exp(-a00-a11*INFO)). 
COMPUTE Preserve1 = 1/(1+exp(-b0-b1*INFO-b2*preservemed1998-
b3*RecodedLeftRight)). 
COMPUTE Adjust1 = 1/(1+exp(-b00-b11*INFO-b22*adjustmed1998-
b33*RecodedLeftRight)). 
COMPUTE Preserve2 = 1/(1+exp(-b0-b1*INFO-b2*preservemed2002-
b3*RecodedLeftRight)). 
COMPUTE Adjust2 = 1/(1+exp(-b00-b11*INFO-b22*adjustmed2002-
b33*RecodedLeftRight )). 
COMPUTE Preserve3 = 1/(1+exp(-b0-b1*INFO-b2*preservemed2003-
b3*RecodedLeftRight)). 
COMPUTE Adjust3 = 1/(1+exp(-b00-b11*INFO-b22*adjustmed2003t-
b33*RecodedLeftRight)). 
 
#Compute influence gaps 
COMPUTE Preservet1 = Preservet0 + Preserve1 * (1-Adjust1) * (1-Preservet0) - Adjust1 * 
(1-Preserve1) * Preservet0. 
COMPUTE Adjustt1 = Adjustt0 + Adjust1 * (1-Preserve1) * (1-Adjustt0) - Preserve1 * (1 - 
Adjust1) * Adjustt0. 
COMPUTE Preservet2 = Preservet1 + Preserve2 * (1-Adjust2) * (1-Preservet1) - Adjust2 * 
(1-Preserve2) * Preservet1. 
COMPUTE Adjustt2 = Adjustt1 + Adjust2 * (1-Preserve2) * (1-Adjustt1) - Preserve2 * (1 - 
Adjust2) * Adjustt1. 
COMPUTE Preservet3 = Preservet2 + Preserve3 * (1-Adjust3) * (1-Preservet2) - Adjust3 * 
(1-Preserve3) * Preservet2. 
COMPUTE Adjustt3 = Adjustt2 + Adjust3 * (1-Preserve3) * (1-Adjustt3) - Preserve3 * (1 - 
Adjust3) * Adjustt2. 
 
COMPUTE PreserveP = (p1 * Preservet1 + p2 * Preservet2 + p3 * Preservet3). 
COMPUTE AdjustP = (p1 * Adjustt1 + p2 *Adjustt2 + p3 * Adjustt3). 
COMPUTE NoChange = 1 - PreserveP - AdjustP. 
COMPUTE PRED = ((-LG10(PreserveP) * PreserveOpinion - LG10(AdjustP) * 
AdjustOpinion - LG10(NoChange)*CenterOpinion)**.5). 
/*COMPUTE PRED = ((-LG10(PreserveP) * PreserveOpinion - LG10(AdjustP) * 
AdjustOpinion)**.5). 
 
#Test model 
NLR var0 with INFO p1 p2 p3 preservemed1998 adjustmed1998 preservemed2002 
adjustmed2002 preservemed2003 adjustmed2003 PreserveOpinion CenterOpinion 
AdjustOpinion 
  /PRED PRED 
  /CRITERIA SSCONVERGENCE 1E-8 PCON 1E-8. 
